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ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL: THE 
SUPREME COURT’S DISTORTED 
INTERPRETATION OF THE INDIAN CHILD 
WELFARE ACT OF 1978 
Jessica Di Palma 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 
(ICWA)1 to establish federal standards governing state-court  
child-custody cases involving Indian children.2 The statute attempted 
to remedy the unwarranted removal of Indian children from their 
biological parents by nontribal public and private agencies, by 
creating “minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian 
children from their families . . . .”3 Most Americans had likely never 
heard of this statute, until a highly publicized child custody case 
thrust the ICWA into the media spotlight.4 
In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,5 a case that received more 
publicity for its soap opera-like facts and heart-wrenching drama 
than for its impact on the law, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court 
held that the ICWA does not apply in cases where the biological 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. English, University 
of California, Santa Barbara, June 2008. I would like to thank Professor Seagull Song for her 
guidance and feedback on this Comment. Thank you to the talented and dedicated editors and 
staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. Finally, I am forever grateful to my parents and 
sister for their unconditional love and support. 
 1. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006). 
 2. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013). 
 3. 25 U.S.C. § 1902. See also Carol Schultz Vento, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 89 A.L.R. 5th 195 (2013) (analyzing cases 
where the courts have applied the ICWA to child custody proceedings). 
 4. This dramatic legal saga has been a continuing focus of the media. See, e.g., Adoption 
Controversy: Battle over Baby Veronica, DR. PHIL (June 6, 2013), http://www.drphil.com/shows 
/show/1895 (featuring Veronica’s adoptive parents telling Dr. Phil’s nationwide audience their 
emotional story of losing custody of Veronica); Veronica May Not Be Saved, ABC NEWS 4 
(July 26, 2012), http://www.abcnews4.com/story/19121303/veronica-may-not-be-saved 
(explaining that updates about the legal saga were posted on a “Save Veronica” Facebook page). 
 5. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 
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“parent abandoned the Indian child before birth and never had 
custody of the child.”6 
A superficial read of this case and the media reports surrounding 
it would likely lead to the conclusion that this holding involves a 
straightforward case of statutory interpretation applied cautiously to 
a set of unfortunate facts.7 But with a deeper examination of the 
ICWA’s text, structure, and legislative purpose, it becomes clear that 
the Court oversimplified the law and overlooked the legislative 
purpose behind this statute. As Justice Sotomayor observed in her 
dissenting opinion, “[i]n truth, however, the path from the text of the 
[ICWA] to the result the Court reaches is anything but clear, and its 
result anything but right.”8 
This Comment examines Adoptive Couple’s interpretation of the 
ICWA in detail. Part II of this Comment presents the historical 
framework behind the ICWA’s enactment and an overview of the 
statutory provisions at issue in this case. Part III outlines the facts 
and procedural history that led to the Court’s decision. Part IV 
summarizes and compares the Court’s conflicting majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part V argues that this case was 
wrongly decided because the Court ignored the legislative intent of 
the ICWA and distorted its plain language to reach what the majority 
felt was the correct moral result. This Comment further argues that 
the Court’s results-oriented holding unnecessarily complicates the 
straightforward language of the ICWA, which will result in many 
unintended consequences. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978 
Pursuant to its enumerated power under the Indian Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution,9 Congress enacted the ICWA in 1978 to 
establish minimum federal standards applicable to state-court  
child-custody proceedings involving Indian children.10 
 
 6. Id. at 2557. 
 7. See id. at 2572 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“A casual reader of the Court’s opinion could 
be forgiven for thinking this is an easy case, one in which the text of the applicable statute clearly 
points the way to the only sensible result.”). 
 8. Id. 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have the power . . . to regulate 
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”). 
 10. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2557. Under the ICWA, an Indian child is defined as “any 
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is 
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Before Adoptive Couple, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 
v. Holyfield11 was the first and only Supreme Court case to address 
the ICWA.12 There, the Court explained that the ICWA was the 
“product of rising concern in the mid-1970s over the consequences to 
Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child 
welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of 
Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or 
foster care placement usually in non-Indian homes.”13 In 1969 and 
1974, the Association on American Indian Affairs conducted studies 
showing “that 25 to 35 [percent] of all Indian children had been 
separated from their families and placed in adoptive families, foster 
care, or institutions.”14 
In 1974, these findings were presented to the legislature in 
Senate hearings, and further testimony was presented in hearings in 
1977 and 1978 on the bill that eventually became the ICWA.15 This 
testimony provided the basis for the congressional findings expressly 
stated in § 1901 of the ICWA.16 Congress found “that an alarmingly 
high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, 
often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public 
and private agencies . . . .”17 The ICWA thus “seeks to protect the 
rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian 
community and tribe in retaining its children in its society.”18 The 
statute does so by establishing numerous protections of the rights of 
 
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian 
tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2006). 
 11. 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (holding that an Indian couple’s voluntary placement of their two 
Indian children with non-Indian adoptive parents violated the ICWA). 
 12. See Marcia Zug, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Two-and-a-Half Ways To Destroy 
Indian Law, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 46, 49 (2013), http:// 
www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/111/Zug.pdf. 
 13. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32. 
 14. Id. (citing Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian 
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 15 (1974) (statement of 
William Byler)). 
 15. Id. at 33–34 (citing Hearing on S. 1214 before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs & Public 
Lands of the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. (1978); Hearing on S. 1214 
before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977)).  
 16. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006). 
 17. Id. § 1901(4). 
 18. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 23 (1978). 
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Indian parents so that “where possible, an Indian child should remain 
in the Indian community.”19 
Three provisions of the ICWA are particularly relevant to this 
case, two of which are found in § 1912.20 Section 1912 of the ICWA 
sets out procedural and substantive standards applicable to “any 
involuntary proceeding in a [s]tate court,”21 including involuntary 
termination of parental rights proceedings—the type of proceeding at 
issue in Adoptive Couple.22 Specifically, under § 1912(d), “Any party 
seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of 
parental rights to an Indian child under state law” must demonstrate 
that “active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and 
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian 
family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.”23 Under 
§ 1912(f), a state court may not involuntarily terminate parental 
rights to an Indian child “in the absence of a determination, 
supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including 
testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of 
the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”24 Finally, where 
Indian children are separated from their biological parents by foster 
care or adoption, § 1915(a) sets forth a list of preferred adoptive 
placements for the child.25  
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a four-year-old child, named Veronica 
Rose—referred to as “Baby Girl” by the Court—who is 1.2 percent 
Cherokee Indian and therefore classified as an Indian under the 
ICWA.26 Veronica is the biological child of Christy Maldonado,27 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013). 
 21. 25 U.S.C. § 1912. 
 22. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560. 
 23. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). 
 24. Id. § 1912(f). 
 25. Id. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a 
preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a 
member of the child’s extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other 
Indian families.”). 
 26. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556, 2557 n.1. 
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who is primarily Hispanic, and Dusten Brown,28 a registered member 
of the Cherokee Nation.29 In January 2009, one month after their 
engagement, Maldonado told Brown that she was pregnant with 
Veronica.30 After Brown issued an ultimatum, telling Maldonado that 
he would not provide financial support to her or the baby until they 
were married, the couple’s relationship became strained; Maldonado 
ended the engagement in May 2009.31 
One month after that, Maldonado issued an ultimatum of her 
own, asking Brown—via text message—whether he would rather 
pay child support or relinquish his parental rights.32 Brown sent back 
a text message, telling Maldonado that he would give up his parental 
rights.33 According to Maldonado, that was the last time she heard 
from Brown.34 
Soon after, Maldonado decided to give Baby Veronica up for 
adoption.35 Working with an attorney and a private adoption agency, 
Maldonado chose Matt and Melanie Capobianco, non-Indians living 
in South Carolina, to adopt Veronica.36 The Capobiancos37 provided 
financial support for Maldonado until Veronica was born on 
September 15, 2009.38 The next day, Maldonado signed the adoption 
papers.39 The Capobiancos then returned to South Carolina with 
 
 27. See Christy Maldonado, Baby Veronica Belongs with Her Adoptive Parents, WASH. 
POST, July 12, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-12/opinions/40529306_1_matt-
and-melanie-adoptive-parents-melanie-capobianco. 
 28. See Robert Barnes, Baby Veronica’s Loved Ones Wait for the Supreme Court to Weigh 
In, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/baby-veronicas-loved-
ones-wait-for-the-supreme-court-to-weigh-in/2013/04/14/7138b5f0-a526-11e2-a8e2-
5b98cb59187f_story.html. 
 29. The Court’s opinion refers to Maldonado as “Birth Mother” and Brown as “Birth 
Father.” Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Maldonado, supra note 27 
 35. For a first-person account of her reasons for making the “most difficult decision” of her 
life, see id. 
 36. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558. It should also be noted that during the adoption 
proceedings, Maldonado’s attorney contacted the Cherokee Nation to inquire whether Brown was 
a formally registered member. Id. But because “[t]he inquiry letter misspelled [Brown’s] first 
name and incorrectly stated his birthday,” the Cherokee Nation was unable to provide 
confirmation that Brown was indeed a registered member. Id. 
 37. Maldonado, supra note 27.  
 38. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558. 
 39. Id. 
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Veronica, where they began adoption proceedings in the South 
Carolina Family Court.40 During the first four months of Veronica’s 
life, Dusten Brown “made no meaningful attempts to assume his 
responsibility of parenthood.”41 
Approximately four months after Veronica was born, the 
Capobiancos served Brown with notice of the pending adoption, 
which was the first time that either they or Maldonado had notified 
Brown of the adoption proceedings.42 “Brown signed the papers 
stating that he accepted service and that he was ‘not contesting the 
adoption.’”43 Brown later admitted that he believed by signing the 
papers he relinquished his parental rights to Maldonado, not to the 
Capobiancos.44 Soon after signing the papers, Brown hired a lawyer 
who subsequently initiated court proceedings to stay Veronica’s 
adoption.45 In these proceedings, Brown testified that he did not 
consent to the adoption, and he petitioned for custody of Veronica.46 
In September 2011, following a trial, the Family Court denied 
the Capobiancos’ petition for adoption and awarded Brown custody 
of then two-year-old Veronica.47 The court held that the Capobiancos 
“had not carried the heightened burden under § 1912(f) of proving 
that Veronica would suffer serious emotional or physical damage if 
[Brown] had custody.”48 Veronica was officially placed in his 
custody on December 31, 2011—the first time that she met her 
biological father.49 
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the 
Family Court’s decision to deny the adoption petition and to award 
custody to Brown.50 The court held that both ICWA § 1912(d) and 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 2558–59. During this time, the Cherokee Nation confirmed that Brown was indeed 
a registered member, and therefore Baby Veronica qualified as an “Indian Child” under the 
ICWA. Id. at 2559 n.2. See also supra Part II (explaining the history of the ICWA, as well as its 
relevance and application to Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl). 
 46. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 552 (S.C. 2012). 
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§ 1912(f) barred the termination of Brown’s parental rights.51 First, 
the court concluded that Brown qualified as a “parent” under the 
ICWA’s definition of this term.52 Next, the court held that under 
§ 1912(d), the Capobiancos had not shown that “active efforts [had] 
been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs 
designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.”53 Further, the 
court held that under § 1912(f), the Capobiancos had not met the 
steep burden of proving that Brown’s custody of Veronica would 
“result in serious emotional or physical harm to her beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”54 On January 4, 2013, the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.55 
IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
A.  The Majority Opinion 
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Alito reversed the 
South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision, holding that even if 
Brown met the ICWA’s definition of “parent,” neither § 1912(f) nor 
§ 1912(d) barred the termination of his parental rights because those 
provisions do not apply when the “relevant parent never had custody 
of the child.”56 The Court further held that while the congressional 
policy behind the statute was to “preserve the cultural identity and 
heritage of Indian tribes,” the ICWA was not meant to “put certain 
vulnerable children at a great disadvantage solely because an 
ancestor—even a remote one—was an Indian.”57 
Working in reverse textual order, the Court began its 
interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions with § 1912(f). The 
Court explained that § 1912(f) conditions the involuntary termination 
of parental rights on a showing regarding the merits of “continued 
 
 51. Id. at 562–63. 
 52. Id. at 560 n.18. 
 53. Id. at 562. 
 54. Id. at 562–63. 
 55. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013). See also Robert Barnes, Supreme 
Court to Examine Indian Child Welfare Act Requirements in Adoption Dispute, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 13, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-to-examine-indian-child-
welfare-act-requirements-in-adoption-case/2013/01/04/b3a0cb44-56b1-11e2-8b9e-dd8773594efc 
_story.html (reporting that the Supreme Court agreed to review the ICWA requirements in the 
case involving Veronica). 
 56. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013). 
 57. Id. at 2565. 
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custody of the child by the parent.”58 The Court cited the Oxford 
English Dictionary’s definition of “continued”—meaning “carried on 
or kept up . . . without interruption or breach of connection”—and 
therefore concluded “the adjective ‘continued’ plainly refers to a pre-
existing state.”59 Thus, under this reading of “continued custody,” 
Brown should never have been able to invoke the protection of 
§ 1912(f) in the lower court proceedings because he did not have 
legal or physical custody of Veronica when the adoption proceedings 
began.60 
The majority next addressed § 1912(d), holding that similar to 
the word “continuing” in § 1912(f), this provision “applies only in 
cases where an Indian family’s ‘breakup’ would be precipitated by 
the termination of the parent’s [existing] rights.”61 Citing to the 
dictionary definition of “breakup”—meaning the “discontinuance of 
a relationship”—the Court concluded that for there to be a 
“breakup,” there must have been a preexisting relationship.62 The 
Court explained that this interpretation of the provision conforms to 
Congress’s intent to prevent the unwarranted removal of Indian 
children from an existing family unit.63 But it would be “unusual to 
apply § 1912(d) in the context of an Indian parent who abandoned a 
child prior to birth and who never had custody of the child.”64 
Finally, the Court addressed § 1915(a), which lists the 
“preferences for the adoptive placement of an Indian child.”65 The 
Court held that § 1915(a)’s preferences do not apply “in cases where 
no alternative party had formally sought to adopt the child.”66 The 
Court further explained that logically, there is “simply no 
‘preference’ to apply if no alternative party . . . under § 1915(a) has 
come forward.”67 The Court therefore concluded that because the 
Capobiancos were the only party who “formally sought to adopt” 
 
 58. Id. at 2557–58 (emphasis added) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2006)).  
 59. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560 (citing COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 909 (1981 reprint of 1971 ed.)). 
 60. Id. at 2562. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 235 (3d ed. 1992)). 
 63. Id. at 2563. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 2564–65. 
 66. Id. at 2564. 
 67. Id. 
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Veronica, the § 1915(a) adoption preferences did not apply.68 Section 
1915(a) did not apply to Brown because he did not seek to adopt 
Veronica.69 Rather, Brown’s main argument to the South Carolina 
Family Court was that his parental rights should not be terminated.70 
Further, § 1915(a) did not apply because neither Veronica’s paternal 
grandparents nor a member of the Cherokee Nation sought to adopt 
Veronica.71 Therefore, the Court held that when the South Carolina 
Supreme Court held that § 1915(a)’s adoption preferences would 
have applied had the court terminated Brown’s parental rights, the 
court failed to address this “critical limitation” on the applicability of 
§ 1915(a): that this section’s “rebuttable adoption preferences” only 
apply when an alternative party seeks to adopt the Indian child.72 
B.  Justice Thomas’s Concurrence 
Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion, but wrote separately 
to explain what he considered the “significant constitutional 
problems” with the ICWA.73 Beginning with the historical 
background of the Indian Commerce Clause during the drafting of 
the Constitution,74 Justice Thomas explained that the history and the 
text of the Clause do not grant Congress “plenary power over Indian 
affair” but rather “conferred on Congress the much narrower power 
to regulate trade with Indian tribes.”75 
He therefore concluded that because the ICWA regulates Indian 
child custody proceedings—not commerce—Congress lacked the 
enumerated power to “support Congress’ intrusion into this area of 
traditional state authority.”76 Therefore, “application of the ICWA to 
these [state-court] child custody proceedings would be 
unconstitutional.”77 Because Justice Thomas believed that the 
majority’s interpretation of the relevant ICWA provisions and 
 
 68. Id. at 2564–65. 
 69. Id. at 2564. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2564–65. 
 73. Id. at 2565 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. at 2568–69. 
 75. Id. at 2567. 
 76. Id. at 2566. 
 77. Id. at 2571. 
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conclusion that those provisions did not apply to this case avoided 
these constitutional problems, he concurred with the Court.78 
C.  Justice Breyer’s Concurrence 
Justice Breyer joined the majority’s opinion, but made several 
observations of potential issues that could arise in future ICWA cases 
because of the Court’s opinion.79 First, he observed that there is a 
risk that the majority’s interpretation of §§ 1912(d) and (f), which 
excludes parents who never had custody of their children in the first 
place, may unintentionally exclude too many categories of Indian 
parents.80 While the majority’s interpretation of these provisions 
contemplates the exclusion of absentee parents, the provisions may 
now also be inapplicable to those parents who are involved in their 
child’s life but may have never had physical custody of the child.81 
Justice Breyer also warned that “[w]e should decide here no 
more than is necessary” and cautioned against the Court’s extending 
the statutory interpretation to hypothetical factual scenarios.82 Justice 
Breyer’s opinion essentially acknowledged that while he concurs in 
the result of this case because Veronica will be returned to her 
adoptive parents, this result may have dangerous future 
consequences. 
D.  Justice Scalia’s Dissent 
In a short yet powerful dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia stated 
that while he joined Justice Sotomayor in her dissent, he had 
different reasons for rejecting the majority’s restrictive interpretation 
of the words “continued custody” in § 1912(f).83 He argued that 
“there is no reason that ‘continued’ must refer to custody in the past 
rather than custody in the future.”84 Justice Scalia, who joined the 
majority opinion in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. 
Holyfield85 and called it one of the most difficult decisions of his 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2571 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. 
 85. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).  
ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL 9/25/2014 4:07 PM 
2014] ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL 533 
 
career,86 added an additional thought to his Adoptive Couple opinion. 
He noted that the majority “needlessly demean[ed] the rights of 
parenthood” that were long respected by the common law.87 The best 
interests of the child, he pointed out, are not in fact considered when 
a baby is born; unless there is some controversy about custody, the 
child ordinarily stays with his or her biological parents.88 Some 
children, Justice Scalia said, might “be better off raised by someone 
else,” but “there is no reason in law or policy to dilute that 
protection” of parental rights that is inherent in having a biological 
child.89  
E.  Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent 
In her dissenting opinion and joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Kagan, and Scalia, Justice Sotomayor accused the majority of 
turning the law upside down to reach the result it wanted—the 
morally appealing result of denying an absent dad custody of the 
daughter he gave away.90 Justice Sotomayor said the point of the law 
was to keep Indian children with their parents and to make adoptions 
outside the tribe less likely.91 She wrote that while “[t]he majority 
may consider this scheme unwise . . . no principle of construction 
licenses a court to interpret a statute with a view to averting the very 
consequences Congress expressly stated it was trying to bring 
about.”92 She further predicted that “the anguish this case has caused 
will only be compounded by today’s decision.”93 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Despite the fact that Congress enacted the ICWA to protect the 
parental rights of biological Indian parents in state court actions, a 
majority of the Supreme Court concluded that none of the applicable 
statutory provisions “creates parental rights for unwed fathers where 
 
 86. Barnes, supra note 55.  
 87. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2572 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2572 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 2574. 
 92. Id. at 2583. 
 93. Id. at 2586. 
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no such rights would otherwise exist.”94 This holding distorted the 
ICWA’s text and disregarded the will of Congress. 
A.  The Court’s Interpretation of the ICWA Distorts the Text and 
Ignores the Statute’s Legislative Purpose 
While the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Adoptive Couple 
attempts to prioritize the child by predicting the best long-term result 
for Veronica,95 it does so by ignoring Congress’s intent as well as the 
plain language of the ICWA. 
First, the majority opinion reached the legally incorrect result 
because it ignored the clear congressional findings and legislative 
intent behind the ICWA’s enactment. Adoption proceedings, along 
with most family law cases, are typically adjudicated in state court 
and are governed by state common law.96 Congress enacted the 
ICWA—an exception to this general rule97—to address the very 
specific problem of the unwarranted removal of Indian children from 
their biological parents.98 The ICWA thus “seeks to protect the rights 
of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian 
community and tribe in retaining its children in its society.”99 It does 
so by establishing uniform federal standards to ensure that Indian 
child welfare determinations are not based on “a white, middle-class 
standard which, in many cases, forecloses placement with [an] Indian 
family.”100 
Therefore, a court interpreting the ICWA’s text must do so in a 
way that effectuates the legislative goal of keeping Indian children 
with their biological parents, or at least within the Indian culture. The 
Supreme Court failed to do so. Instead, a majority of the Justices 
 
 94. Id. at 2563 (majority opinion). 
 95. See id. at 2565 (stating that the ICWA was not meant to “put certain vulnerable children 
at a great disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even a remote one—was an Indian”). 
 96. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (“[D]omestic relations [is] an area that has 
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.”); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 
593–94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and 
child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”). 
 97. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2557. 
 98. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2006) (“Congress finds . . . that there is no resource that is 
more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the 
United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members of or 
are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.”). 
 99. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 23 (1978). 
 100. Id. at 24. 
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made a moral determination of what they believed was in Veronica’s 
best interest—that she should be raised by the Capobiancos instead 
of her noncustodial biological father—because Brown “abandoned” 
his child “prior to birth and . . . never had custody” of his own 
child.101 This is not the correct legal result. 
In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the Court 
stated that “the [ICWA’s] most important substantive requirement 
imposed on state courts is that of § 1915(a), which, absent ‘good 
cause’ to the contrary, mandates that adoptive placements be made 
preferentially . . .” with an enumerated list of potential Indian 
guardians.102 This is a logical connection between Congress’s intent 
behind the statute—to keep Indian children within the Indian 
community—and the location of this statutory provision as the 
subsection listed first within a long set of requirements. The Court 
ignored the logical structure and order of the statute by analyzing the 
applicable provisions of the ICWA in reverse order. This “textually 
backward reading,”103 placed more importance on the words 
“continuing” and “breakup” in order to conform the text of the 
statute to fit the majority’s desired outcome. 
The plain text of the statute also leads to a different result. 
Section 1912(f) contains a heightened burden of proof that must be 
met before a court will approve the adoption of an Indian child: the 
Indian parent’s continued custody of the Indian child would “result 
in serious emotional or physical harm to her beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”104 Congress’s inclusion of this high evidentiary threshold 
demonstrates that the provisions of the ICWA must be interpreted as 
high hurdles to overcome before an Indian child may be placed with 
non-Indian adoptive parents. 
B.  The Potential Negative Consequences of the Court’s Opinion 
The Court disregarded the clear legislative intent behind the 
enactment of the ICWA and manipulated the statute’s plain language 
to reach what the majority of Justices felt was the “morally correct” 
 
 101. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2563. See also id. at 2573 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(noting the “majority’s focus on [Brown’s] perceived parental shortcomings”). 
 102. 490 U.S. 30, 36–37 (emphasis added). 
 103. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2573 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 104. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 562–63 (S.C. 2012) (emphasis added). 
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result. While the majority attempted to rationalize its opinion by 
stating that this holding is limited to the facts of this particular 
case,105 this will not prevent the unintended consequences of the 
holding, particularly the issue of Indian children being removed from 
their biological parents because state agencies (or in this case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court) deemed the parents unfit.106 
Indeed, as the dissent predicts, there is now a risk that the 
majority’s interpretation of §§ 1912(d) and (f) will not apply to 
biological parents who never had physical custody of their children, 
but who have visitation rights or provide other financial and 
emotional support.107 These parents will be precluded from the 
protections Congress intended to afford them under the ICWA. 
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer cautioned that “[w]e should 
decide here no more than is necessary,” and also cautioned against 
the Court extending the statutory interpretation to hypothetical 
factual scenarios.108 But even Justice Breyer recognized that the 
majority’s interpretation could exclude too many absentee Indian 
fathers, and thus defeat the purpose and legislative intent behind the 
ICWA: to prevent the removal of Indian children from their 
biological parents and subsequent placement in non-Indian adoptive 
or foster homes.109 
There are already negative consequences arising from the 
Court’s decision in this case, as demonstrated by the lower court 
proceedings that have occurred since the Court remanded the case 
back to the lower courts on June 25, 2013. On July 17, 2013, the 
South Carolina Supreme Court, in accordance with the Court’s 
interpretation of the ICWA, remanded the case to the “Family Court 
for the prompt entry of an order approving and finalizing Adoptive 
Couple’s adoption of [Veronica], and thereby terminating [Brown’s] 
parental rights.”110 While the court also noted that “there is 
absolutely no need to compound any suffering that Baby Girl may 
 
 105. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2563 n.8. 
 106. See Brief of Family Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents Birth 
Father and Cherokee Nation at 14, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 
1308809, at *14; Stan Watts, Voluntary Adoptions Under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 
Balancing the Interests of Children, Families, and Tribes, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 213 (1989). 
 107. 133 S. Ct. at 2572–73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 108. Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 2557 (majority opinion).  
 110. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 51, 54 (S.C. 2013). 
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experience through continued litigation,”111 on July 22, 2013, Brown 
filed a petition for rehearing with the South Carolina Supreme Court, 
which the court denied.112 
On September 3, 2013, the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted an 
emergency stay to keep Veronica with Brown.113 But, on September 
23, 2013, Brown turned over custody of Veronica to the 
Capobiancos.114 Although Brown announced that he had dismissed 
all pending custody claims to spare Veronica continued public 
exposure,115 the legal saga continues. On November 1, 2013, the 
Capobiancos filed a claim against Brown and the Cherokee Nation 
seeking recovery of more than $1 million in costs accrued during the 
custody proceedings.116 This drawn-out litigation demonstrates that 
while the Supreme Court attempted to reach a result it felt was in 
Veronica’s best interest, the decision is subjecting Veronica—and all 
of the parties involved—to continuing turmoil. This cannot be what 
is in Veronica’s “best interest.”117 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme 
Court issued what it felt was a “morally correct” result. But in 
reality, the Court’s interpretation of the ICWA was a legally 
incorrect, results-oriented holding that ignored the text and purpose 
 
 111. Id. at 53. 
 112. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 346, 346–47 (S.C. 2013). 
 113. “Baby Veronica” Custody Case: Oklahoma Supreme Court Grants Stay to Keep Girl 
with Biological Dad, CBS NEWS (Sept. 3, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
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with-biological-dad/. 
 114. Robin Abcarian, Legal Battle Over Native American Girl Comes to a Poignant End, 
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 117. See Editorial Board, Indian Child Welfare Act May Need Some Limits, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/indian-child-welfare-act-may-need-
some-limits/2013/04/15/8db00cae-a613-11e2-b029-8fb7e977ef71_story.html (“Imagine one of 
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almost every fact is disputed. Many people—including the child in the middle of the fight—have 
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of the statute. The Court’s distorted and oversimplified interpretation 
of the ICWA will likely lead to legal consequences for families 
dealing with the already complex and emotionally turbulent adoption 
and custody proceedings. These consequences are exemplified by the 
harsh practical result of the Court’s decision—Veronica has twice 
been separated from her families, first from the Capobiancos and 
now from Brown, whom she lived with for nearly two years.118 She 
is a true victim of this law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 118. Abcarian, supra note 114. 
